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1. Introduction 
 
Sergio Leone’s classic spaghetti western “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”,1 
provides, perhaps surprisingly, a fitting allegory for elements of the feminist critique 
of family mediation.  The film’s moral ambiguity, implicit in its title, mirrors the 
ambiguity of the feminist critique of mediation which sees the process at once as 
empowering and positive for women (the good), as a process in which women are 
potentially vulnerable (the bad), and also as a process in which women, particularly 
those who are victims of violence, are categorically disadvantaged (the ugly).   
 
In this article, these three aspects of the feminist critique are used to analyse issues 
arising for women as a result of the introduction in Australia in 2006 of, what is in 
effect, mandatory family dispute resolution in children’s disputes.2  The article argues 
                                                 
∗ BA/LLB(Hons)(ANU) LLM(Hons)(QUT) Grad Cert in Education (Higher Education) (QUT), admitted but not 
practising as a Barrister and Solicitor (ACT) Solicitor (Qld), Lecturer, Faculty of Law Queensland University of 
Technology.  PhD Candidate under the supervision of Professor Hilary Astor, Faculty of Law, University of 
Sydney.  This article draws on previous work, in particular Rachael Field “A Feminist Model Of Mediation That 
Centralises The Role Of Lawyers As Advocates For Participants Who Are Victims Of Domestic Violence” (2004) 
20 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 65, and Rachael Field “Federal Family Law Reform in 2005: The 
Problems and Pitfalls for Women and Children of an Increased Emphasis on Post-Separation Informal Dispute 
Resolution” (2005) 5(1) QUT Law and Justice Journal 28.  Special thanks to Dr Ian Wells and Donna Cooper of 
the Faculty of Law, QUT for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to the anonymous reviewer for their 
constructive critique and suggestions. 
1   A précis of the film can be found on the Wikipedia site available at www.wikipedia.org (accessed 10 February 
2006) 
2   The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) (referred to hereafter as the Bill) 
s.60I.  Note that the Family Law Rules of 2004 set the scene for this development by introducing “Pre-Action 
Procedures” that required parties in both financial and parenting cases to “make a genuine effort to resolve the 
dispute before starting a case by: (a) participating in primary dispute resolution, such as negotiation, conciliation 
arbitration and counseling; (b) exchanging a notice of intention to claim and exploring options for settlement by 
correspondence; and (c) complying, as far as practicable, with the duty of disclosure.” See Schedule 1, Part 1 
(1)(1) and Part 2 (1)(1).  This development fell short of mandating mediation but place an onus on the parties to at 
least negotiate in some way prior to filing in the Court.  Exceptions also exist under section 4 of these Parts of the 
rules involving (a) urgency; (b) allegations of child abuse; (c) allegations of family violence; (d) a genuinely 
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that whilst family dispute resolution can be a positive process for women, it can also 
be an environment in which women face significant disadvantages.  These potential 
disadvantages mean that mandating family dispute resolution, as a process of first 
resort in children’s disputes, will potentially create great post-separation injustice for 
women, and consequently for many children (an important consideration given the 
heavy emphasis on the best-interests of the children that dominates rhetoric about the 
Bill).   
 
The central thesis of this article is that mandating family dispute resolution reflects a 
critical misunderstanding on the part of current family law policy makers of key 
aspects of consensus based informal dispute resolution, as well as of the reality of 
post-separation life for women.  These misunderstandings have resulted in false 
assumptions about family dispute resolution; namely, that it is almost always good, 
that it is hardly ever bad, and that it doesn’t get ugly.   
The term “family dispute resolution” is defined in section 10F of the Family Law 
Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) as “a process (other than 
a judicial process): (a) in which a family dispute resolution practitioner helps people 
affected, or likely to be affected, by separation or divorce to resolve some or all of 
their disputes with each other; and (b) in which the practitioner is independent of all 
the parties involved in the process.”3  The emphasis in the definition is clearly on a 
process that is both “helping” and not adjudicative, which could infer any one of 
many informal approaches to dispute resolution.  However, as mediation is the key 
form (apart perhaps from counselling) of informal dispute resolution used for family 
disputes in Australia, and internationally, the focus for the analysis in this article is on 
mediation.4  This focus is also justified by Government information relating to the 
new Family Relationship Centres, through which a significant amount of the family 
                                                                                                                                            
intractable dispute; and (e) a situation in which a person would be unduly prejudiced or adversely affected if 
another person to the dispute is given notice of an intention to start a case.  
3   See Division 3 of Schedule 4, Part 3.  A family dispute resolution practitioner is defined as someone who is 
accredited under the Accreditation Rules or authorised to act on behalf of an approved organisation, or authorised 
to act by the Family Court or other provisions of the Family Law Act or the Federal Magistrates Act, 1999: section 
10G of the Bill. 
4  The Standing Committee’s Report also envisaged when making its recommendations that “the available 
processes of primary dispute resolution, such as mediation” would be central to the reforms:  House of 
Representative Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, “Every Picture Tells A Story”  Report on 
the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation, December 2003, Canberra, 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/fca/childcustody/report.htm (accessed 13 February 2006) 
para 4.44 at 77. 
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dispute resolution service provision will occur, which refers to “family dispute 
resolution (mediation and similar services).”5   
There are many definitions of mediation.  Moore’s classic statement is one that is 
widely accepted, describing mediation as a process involving “intervention into a 
dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third-party who has no 
authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching 
their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.”6   Mediation is clearly 
a “helping” and non-adjudicatory process, its prevalence in the practice of family 
dispute resolution under the amendments is therefore assured. 
  
It is important to acknowledge before embarking on a discussion of issues for women 
in the context of family mediation that women’s experiences, whilst sharing some 
commonalities, cannot be essentialised.  Women’s experiences of life post-separation 
and of the family mediation process are, of course, diverse and informed by individual 
issues of influence, such as race and socio-economic background.  The issues raised 
here, however, are ones of common experience for women that are fundamentally 
gender based.  Similarly, it is important to acknowledge that there are many 
manifestations of feminism and feminist thought and practice.  As it is beyond the 
scope of this article to explore these, however, the word “feminist” should be 
understood inclusively and with a focus on the common feminist aim; namely, the 
promotion and protection of the interests of women in the context of redressing the 
continuing patriarchal oppression of women.  A belief in the realities of women’s 
lives and experiences is central to this aim.7
 
1. The Introduction of Mandatory Mediation to Australian Family Law in 2006 
                                                 
5   The website states that the Family Relationship Centres will provide “family dispute resolution (mediation and 
similar services) to assist families sort out their separation issues rather than going to court and to help identify 
unresolved conflict before going to court.”  See http://www.ag.gov.au/family (accessed 14 February 2006) 
6  Christopher Moore The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict Jossey Bass San 
Francisco 1986 at 14. 
7 Patricia Cain “Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories” (1989) 4 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 191.  
Christine A Littleton “Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes” (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 
751. 
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On 8 December 2005 the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) 
Bill 2005 was introduced into Federal Parliament for its first reading.8  At the time the 
Bill was described by the Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock as “the most significant 
reforms to the family law system in 30 years.”9  This was an ambitious statement 
given the nature of the reforms to children’s matters of 1995, but justified even simply 
in terms of the significance of the introduction of mandatory family dispute resolution 
in children’s matters.  The Attorney-General’s news release described the new 
requirements for children’s disputes simply as: amendments to family law that will 
“make all child-related proceedings in court less adversarial.”10  In fact, section 60I11 
now provides for compulsory attendance at family dispute resolution before an 
application can be lodged with the court.   
The Bill’s explanatory memorandum claims that the new requirement “is a key 
change to encourage a culture of agreement making and avoidance of an adversarial 
court system.”12  The initial push to encourage such a culture came from the 2003 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs’ 
inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation.13  That 
committee’s report recommended that separating parents should be required to 
“undertake mediation or other forms of dispute resolution before they are able to 
make an application to a court/tribunal for a parenting order, except when issues of 
entrenched conflict, family violence, substance abuse or serious child abuse, including 
sexual abuse, require direct access to courts/tribunal.”14  This recommendation arose 
out of the Committee’s key concern, which it said was based on a “vast amount of 
                                                 
8   The Bill and accompanying documents such as the Explanatory Memorandum can be accessed via a link at 
http://www.ag.gov.au. (accessed 13 February 2006).  At the time of writing the Bill has been passed by both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate although consideration of the Senate’s proposed amendments remains 
pending.  The amendments do not appear to alter the key content of provisions discussed in this article. 
9   Philip Ruddock “Bill Marks ‘Cultural Shift’ in Dealing with Family Breakdown”, News Release 232/2005 
issued on 8 December 2005 at 1 available at www.law.gov.au/ag (accessed 13 February 2006).  See also, Donna 
Cooper “Family Law Changes:  How Will They Affect Your Practice?”  CCH Online Family Law Feature Story, 
available at http://www.cch.com.au/feature_story.asp?document_id=71146&topic_code=7&category_code=34 
(accessed 31 March 2006). 
10   Ruddock, above note 9 at 2. 
11   This section is in the new Subdivision E which will be inserted into Division 1 of Part VII of the Act (this Part 
of the Act deals with children).  See in particular subsection 60I(7). 
12   Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill – see above note 8, at 19. 
13   House of Representative Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs Report above note 4. 
14   Ibid at xxiii referring to para 3.73. 
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evidence”, about “the animosity that adversarial legal proceedings create between 
separated parents.”15
The new requirement of section 60I will effectively prevent the Family Court from 
hearing an application for an order under Part VII (that is relating to children) unless a 
certificate from a family dispute resolution practitioner is also filed.16  This certificate 
will state one of four things.17  Either that the person did not attend a family dispute 
resolution, but that that was due to the refusal or failure of the other party to attend; 
that the person did not attend because the practitioner considered that it would not be 
appropriate;18 that the person did attend and all attendees made a genuine effort to 
resolve the issues; or that the person did attend but they or the other party did not 
make a genuine effort to resolve the issues.  A certificate will not be required in 
circumstances where a history or threat of family violence or child abuse is 
established (this exception is considered in more detail in section 4 below),19 
although the court must still consider making an order that a person attend a session 
where such an exception applies.20
To cope with the increased demand on dispute resolution services that will result from 
the amendments, the provisions are being rolled in over three phases; it will therefore 
be 1 July 2008 when compulsory family dispute resolution will apply, subject to some 
exceptions, to all applications for parenting orders.    
Nevertheless the roll out of the provisions, and the new emphasis on, and 
encouragement of family dispute resolution, make it clear that from 2006 family 
dispute resolution will be the process of first resort for many children’s disputes.  It 
will be very difficult, particularly from 2008, and despite the exceptions, for a party 
seeking a parenting order, other than by consent,21 to avoid family dispute resolution.  
The following sections of this article explore the implications for women of 
mandating family dispute resolution by analysing, from a feminist perspective, what 
                                                 
15   Ibid at para 4.36 at 75. 
16   Subsection 60I(7) forms part of the third phase of a staggered introduction of the requirement which will apply 
from the second proclaimed date of the Act. 
17   See subsection 60I(8). 
18   This type of certificate was made an addition to the Bill in the amendments introduced by the 
Government into the House of Representative on 27 February 2006. 
19   See subsection 60I(9). 
20   See subsection 60I(10). 
21   See subsection 60I(9)(i). 
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can be considered ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ about family mediation for women.  This 
analysis makes clear the policy error inherent in requiring family dispute resolution to 
be a process of first resort because of the risk of gendered unjust post-separation 
dispute outcomes for women. 
 
2.  Feminist Perspectives on Family Mediation:  The Good 
 
Family mediation can be good for women.  It can be a constructive, positive, 
collaborative negotiation environment in which cooperative bargaining and consensus 
decision-making occur.  These positive characteristics are linked to the focus in 
mediation on both party control and party empowerment;22 critical elements of the 
process that can be argued as “grounded in feminist values and beliefs.”23   
 
The control that parties have over their dispute and its outcome in mediation is 
reflective of the high value that the process accords to parties as individual 
participants.  Mediation can be said to reject hierarchical manifestations of power that 
are based on gender, and to provide opportunities for relationships to be 
reconceptualized outside of such hierarchies.  The control and empowerment 
principles of mediation can therefore be said to give women negotiating power by 
valuing them appropriately and providing a point of contradiction in terms of the 
usual dominance of men in traditionally hierarchical relationship patterns.24  It can 
also be said that the focus in mediation on the facilitation of constructive consensual 
decision-making and cooperative problem-solving is aligned with the feminist 
principle that women as individuals are important to group processes.  These aspects 
of mediation support an understanding of the process as a good dispute resolution 
process for women. 
 
Party control in mediation is aligned with two key theoretical aspirations of the process; 
namely party self-determination and party empowerment.  Providing a context that 
                                                 
22  See RA Baruch Bush and JP Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through 
Empowerment and Recognition, (revised ed, 2005). 
23   Marsha Lichtenstein ‘Mediation and Feminism: Common Values and Challenges’ (2000) 18(1) Mediation 
Quarterly 19 at 19. 
24   Trina Grillo ‘The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women’ (1991)100 Yale Law Journal 1545 at 
1548. 
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facilitates self-determination means that mediation gives parties the opportunity to 
exercise their own “right and ability to make decisions and take actions to follow those 
decisions through.”25  In most models of mediation (excluding evaluative models) there 
is a consistent focus on parties taking responsibility for reaching their own solution to 
their dispute.  This imposition of responsibility creates both the possibility of self-
determination,26 as well as an imperative for it.  Mediators, therefore, will often be 
engaged in explicitly validating “the ability of individuals to speak for themselves,”27 
and expressly recognising an “individual’s competency and right to make their own 
decisions.”28  Such actions and attitudes can, in effect, license women to step out of 
gendered inequalities to take a more equitable stance in terms of seeking a resolution of 
the dispute that accommodates, and incorporates, their own interests and needs.   
 
Importantly, from a feminist perspective, the potential for self-determination for women 
in mediation means that the process can be seen as offering an opportunity to achieve an 
element of social change, at least in relation to the nature of post-separation dispute 
outcomes.  The increased power women can experience in mediation can work towards 
women overcoming some of the negative social, political, and economic influences on 
their lives post-separation.29   Parenting arrangements, for example, can be tailored to 
take account of, and respond to, the individual circumstances of both parents.   Therefore, 
the range of options open to the parties is flexible and can be constructed outside of, and 
in contradiction to, existing social stereotypes and expectations of women, and of women 
as mothers.  This sits well with the feminist goal to circumvent the continued patriarchal 
oppression of women through achieving social change; and contrasts with determinations 
imposed by courts that are inherently restricted by the gendered limitations of legal 
remedial norms.  In mediation, importantly, women are in a situation where pursuit of 
their own outcome priorities is expected, and is integrated into the overall objective of a 
consensus-based outcome.  Mediation can therefore be considered a good dispute 
resolution process for women in the context of post-separation disputes.   
 
                                                 
25   Lichtenstein above note 22 at 21. 
26   Grillo above note 23 at 1548. 
27   Lichtenstein above note 22 at 21. 
28   Ibid. 
29   Ibid. 
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Self-determination and party empowerment are inextricably linked.30  Empowerment is 
good.  Mediation can be said to be empowering for women for a number of reasons.31  
Perhaps most importantly, women are empowered in mediation because they are given a 
voice in an environment that accommodates emotions and story-telling.  As Herrnstein 
has said “the empowerment of individuals possible through mediation is in the best 
tradition of the suffragists and other feminists who have fought so hard to give women a 
voice.”32  Nothing is presumptively irrelevant in mediation.  Women can contribute to 
determining the issues to be put on the agenda, and can decide what it is they want to say 
about them.   
 
Mediation can also be said to empower women because the process creates space for 
nurturing and empathy to be integrated with the expression of women’s voices.  This 
means that the many women who are concerned with an ethic of care33 are able to behave 
in a manner, and contribute to constructing dispute outcomes, that they feel are not only 
suited to their needs and interests, but that they also feel are appropriate.  In mediation, 
women have an opportunity to establish alternative “resistant discourses”,34 for example, 
in terms of “integrating a concern for rights with a concern for needs and 
interrelationships.”35  It is possible to see mediation, then, as providing an 
“individualised process that can address women’s problems in the context of their unique 
personal circumstances and interconnections with others.”36  Women’s values and their 
personal context can therefore inform the dispute resolution environment, and not only be 
acknowledged as relevant, but also attain full and equal expression.37  This again is in 
                                                 
30   Ibid. 
31   In particular Lichtenstein argues that transformative mediation draws many of its values from modern radical 
feminism and feminist social psychology: above note 22 at 30.  Trina Grillo has also said of transformative 
mediation that whilst the process dangers identified by her as of concern for women’s participation in mediation 
are present in transformative mediation ‘they are lessened to the extent the process belongs to the parties not just in 
word but in deed.’: Trina Grillo ‘Respecting the Struggle: Following the Parties’ Lead’ (1996)13(4) Mediation 
Quarterly 279 at 279. 
32  Becky Herrnstein ‘Women and Mediation: A Chance to Speak and Be Heard’ (1996) 13(3) Mediation 
Quarterly 229 at 240.  Rifkin has said that mediation is a feminist alternative to the patriarchal adversarial system 
because of this: Janet Rifkin ‘Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promises and Problems’ (1984) 2 Law and 
Inequality 21 at 23. 
33   Carol Gilligan In a Different Voice Harvard University Press, Harvard (1982). 
34  Carol Smart Feminism and the Power of Law Routledge London (1992) at 160 and 189. 
35   Herrnstein above note 31 at 231. 
36    Ibid. 
37   Lichtenstein above note 22 at 23-25.  The concept of relevance as informed by real context is not a part of 
formal abstract principles of relevance as found in the formal legal system: Grillo above note 23 at 1548.   
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contrast to the nature of traditional legal processes which cast emotion and care as 
subordinate (possibly irrelevant) to linear legal reasoning and abstract legal principles.38   
 
This is all undoubtedly good for women, and the ability of the process to empower them 
means, as Kelly has established through empirical research in the United States, that 
many women will feel more comfortable with their experience of the process, and its 
outcomes (the point of contrast here being litigation).39  According to Kelly “women in 
custody and divorce mediation have reported that mediation enabled them to have a voice 
and express their views and they perceived that they had equal influence over the terms 
of the agreements.”40  Women themselves are saying, then, that the opportunity to speak 
and be heard, and to have their perspective on the dispute valued, is real in mediation.41  
This is good. 
 
The importance of self-determination and empowerment for women in mediation is 
highlighted because of the positive alternative it offers to the gendered nature of the 
current legal system.  This system, which of course includes the family law system of 
Australia, presents itself as gender-neutral;42 but it has been, and continues to be, male-
centred and controlled by male-created forms and values in the guise of false 
“objectivity”.43  It could even be said that the legal system persists in being “saturated 
with masculinity;”44 and as a result, the protections available to women through it remain 
limited.45  Mediation, on the other hand, provides opportunities for subjective and 
contextualised approaches to dispute resolution that do not have to be governed by 
                                                 
38  Grillo above note 23 at 1547. 
39   Joan Kelly ‘Power Imbalance in Divorce and Interpersonal Mediation: Assessment and Intervention’ (1995) 
13(2) Mediation Quarterly 85. 
40  Ibid referring to Joan Kelly and Mary Duryee ‘Women and Men’s Views of Mediation in Voluntary and 
Mandatory Mediation Settings’ (1992) 30 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 34.  See also Joan Kelly 
‘Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents’ Perceptions of Their Processes and Outcomes’ (1989) 24 
Mediation Quarterly page. 
41   Kelly argues that ‘contrary to the concerns expressed by advocates for women, women in custody and divorce 
mediation have reported that mediation enabled them to have a voice and express their views and they perceived 
that they had equal influence over the terms of the agreements.’: Kelly above note 39 at 85 referring to Kelly and 
Duryee above note 39 at 34. 
42   Gilligan above note 32 referred to by Rebecca Emerson Dobash and Russell Dobash Women Violence and 
Social Change Routledge London (1992) at 148. 
43   Carrie Menkel-Meadow ‘Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman’s Lawyering Process’ (1985) 
1 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39 at 50. 
44   Dobash and Dobash above note 41 at 148. 
45   Herrnstein above note 31 at 232. 
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masculine constructs.  The principles of party self-determination and party empowerment 
demonstrate this clearly.  Mediation can therefore be seen as an “ally of feminism.”46
 
In addition, whilst mediation offers an environment that is free from the limitations and 
gendered nature of the legal parameters of dispute resolution, it does not have to be seen 
as abandoning entirely the protections that the legal system has developed. That is, legal 
norms provide, as Mnookin and Kornhauser have phrased it, a shadow in which 
bargaining in informal and private dispute resolution contexts can occur.47  Parties to 
family mediation are very often encouraged to obtain legal advice before agreeing to a 
resolution of a dispute, and therefore outcomes can be seen to be informed by the law 
although not necessarily restricted by it.  The unenforceable nature of mediated outcomes 
could also be argued as adding to the safety of mediated discussions; such discussions are 
not enforceable unless, for example, they are filed as consent orders in the Family Court. 
 
It is clearly possible, then, to situate mediation within a feminist approach to dispute 
resolution and to argue that the process has much to offer women; particularly in terms of 
qualities that the formal legal system cannot provide.  Mediation can be good for women; 
it can be said to display inherently feminist values and principles, and as a result it can be 
used to make a positive contribution to the feminist goal of working to discontinue male 
oppression of women, particularly in the context of post-separation disputes. 
 
However, as the sections below demonstrate, the limitations of mediation in the family 
law context for women are also significant, particularly in disputes where family violence 
is or has been present.  There is a strong feminist concern about ensuring that these issues 
are acknowledged, understood and responded to appropriately.  In the Federal 
Government’s family law amendments of 2006 there is insufficient acknowledgement, 
understanding or response to the issues women face in post-separation circumstances 
generally, and in mediation specifically.  Rather, the amendments will see more and more 
                                                 
46  Lichtenstein above note 22 at 30.  For example, Mediation can potentially save women from enduring the 
heavy individual costs (both financial and emotional) that almost invariably result from bringing traditional rights 
based claims: Herrnstein above note 32 at 230.  Herrnstein also argues that ‘There are problems inherent in the 
strategy of using litigation as an instrument of social reform.’  In that it is the women who endeavour to set 
precedent though test cases that suffer considerably in the effort: ibid.  The integrated approach offered by 
mediation also offers the possibility of avoiding or overcoming ‘the legal system’s historical tendency to classify 
women as a homogeneous class without recognition of their cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic diversity.’: Ibid 
at 231. 
47   Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce” (1979) 
88 Yale Law Journal 950. 
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women in mediated environments in which, realistically, there is little scope for the 
positive aspects of the process to play out.  This is likely to be very bad for women 
because when mediation cannot fulfil its promise of self-determination and empowerment, 
it can result in injustice in the form of inappropriate process and outcomes.   
 
The next section explores some of the feminist concerns about mediation for women, 
demonstrating that whilst mediation can in some circumstances be considered positive for 
women, this is not a sufficient basis on which to mandate mediation in family law 
children’s matters.  Rather, the potential for gendered disadvantages to play out in the 
family mediation context is high.  Mediation should therefore be only one of many 
dispute resolution options available to parties, and parties (and women in particular) need 
to be provided with the financial capacity, and empowered with information, in terms of 
truly being able to make a choice amongst those options.   
 
3. Feminist Perspectives on Family Mediation:  The Bad
 
The feminist literature on dispute resolution, both in Australia and internationally, has 
for some time expressed significant concerns about the potential disadvantages that 
women participants in family mediation may face.48  These concerns highlight what 
might be considered to be the “bad” aspects of family mediation from a feminist 
perspective; namely those aspects of the process that don’t contribute to fighting male 
oppression of women in family and post-separation contexts, but rather lead to the 
increased post-separation vulnerability of women.  This section demonstrates that the 
introduction of mandatory family dispute resolution for children’s disputes in the 
                                                 
48 The Australian critique has been fundamentally informed by the seminal work of Hilary Astor for the National 
Committee on Violence Against Women: Hilary Astor, Position Paper on Mediation, Commonwealth of 
Australia: AGPS, 1991. Issues for women in informal dispute resolution processes have also been a consistent 
theme in my own writing, for example, Rachael Field “Mediation and the Art of Power (Im)balancing” (1996) 12 
QUT Law Journal 264; Rachael Field “Participation in Pre-Trial Negotiations of Family Law Disputes:  Some 
Issues for Women” (1998) 12 Australian Journal of Family Law 240; Rachael Field “Family Law Mediation:  
Process Imbalances Women Should be Aware of Before They Take Part” (1998) 14 QUT Law Journal 23; Rachael 
Field “Convincing the Policy Makers that Mediation is Often an Inappropriate Dispute Resolution Process for 
Women: A Case of Being Seen But Not Heard” (2001)  National Law Review (January) www.nlr.com.au; Rachael 
Field “Victim – Offender Conferencing:  Issues Of Power Imbalance For Women Juvenile Participants” (2004) E 
Law - Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law Vol 11 No 1 (March) available at: 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v11n1/field111.html; Rachael Field “A Feminist Model Of Mediation 
That Centralises The Role Of Lawyers As Advocates For Participants Who Are Victims Of Domestic Violence” 
(2004) 20 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 65, and Rachael Field “Federal Family Law Reform in 2005: The 
Problems and Pitfalls for Women and Children of an Increased Emphasis on Post-Separation Informal Dispute 
Resolution” (2005) 5(1) QUT Law and Justice Journal 28. 
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2006 Australian family law amendments, jeopardises the justice of post-separation 
outcomes for women.   
 
Whilst the feminist critique of family mediation can accommodate a significant 
acknowledgement of the positive aspects of the process, these elements are, to some 
extent, overshadowed by the reality of the negative potential of family mediation for 
women.  Penelope Bryan, for example, has argued that “mediation empowers only the 
already more powerful husband.”49  Renata Alexander has said that “mediation is a 
form of alternative dispute resolution which supports and perpetuates gender-based 
inequality to the detriment of women.”50  Trina Grillo has queried whether for women 
mediation merely “substitutes another objectivist, patriarchal, and even more 
damaging form of conflict resolution for its adversarial counterpart.”51  Kathy Mack 
has commented that the risks women encounter in informal dispute resolution 
processes directly reflect “the factors by which women’s subordination is maintained 
in society generally.”52  And Hilary Astor has warned that removing family disputes 
into the private sphere of mediation will work to undermine “efforts to expose the 
relevance of power differentials between men and women.”53  These are challenging 
perspectives, particularly for practising family mediators, most of whom it is fair to 
say, are driven by a commitment to the “good” of the process. 
 
Indeed, many reflective practising mediators connect professionally and positively 
with the difficult concerns of the feminist critique of family mediation.  They engage 
with its primary objective to pursue and ensure justice and equity for women through 
the prevention of inappropriate process and outcomes.54  On the other hand, however, 
some (perhaps even many) mediators struggle with the fact that the feminist critique 
of family mediation questions some of the key foundational theories of the process; 
and in particular, can be taken as doubting the capacity of mediation to provide a 
                                                 
49  Penelope Bryan “Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power” (1992) 40(2) Buffalo Law 
Review 441-523 at 445. 
50 Renata Alexander “Family Mediation: Friend or Foe For Women?”  (1997) 8 Australian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 255 at 255. 
51  Grillo above note 23 at 1548. 
52  Kathy Mack “Alternative Dispute Resolution and Access to Justice for Women.” (1995) 17 Adelaide Law 
Review 123 at 146. 
53  Astor above note 47 at 17.   
54  Grillo, above note 23; Rifkin, above note 31. 
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balanced negotiation field in which self-determination and party empowerment are 
truly possible for women.  Joan Kelly, for example, has commented that “the debate 
focusing on power and weakness in mediation has relied heavily on personal 
anecdotes, theoretical assumptions, and feminist rhetoric.”55   Kelly’s view is that the 
debate “has not been particularly illuminating”, and that feminist discussions of power 
and power dynamics in relation to the participation of victims of domestic violence in 
mediation have been “simplistic and naïve”.56   
 
Certainly, the absence of an appropriate acknowledgement of issues for women, and 
of the feminist perspective on family dispute resolution, in the Federal Government’s 
family law amendments of 2006 creates a strong imperative for feminist scholars to 
rethink how we argue and present our position.  It appears necessary to find 
alternative ways to express the knowledge, information and factual bases that 
underpin that position if the critique is to be accepted and is to find an avenue for 
influence.   
 
Had the reality of gender-based issues that make participation in mediation different 
for men and women, been understood by the current family law policy makers, 
mediation would not now be a mandatory process of first resort in family disputes.  
Similarly, mandatory family dispute resolution would not be a part of Australia’s 
family law if the Government had any sense of protecting and sustaining the 
important legal rights that have been obtained for women in the family law context, 
and any commitment to avoiding losing or obscuring those rights in “the shadows of 
informality.”57  There appears to be a high level of resistance, on the part of the 
current Federal Government, to acknowledge that our society continues to be 
patriarchally structured and dominated in both public and private spheres.  There is 
also resistance to accepting that ongoing patriarchy has real implications for women 
in terms of their participation in private, informal dispute resolution processes such as 
mediation.  
 
                                                 
55 Kelly above note 38 at 86. 
56 Ibid.  Professor Wade has said that in critiques of mediation the phrase “inequality of bargaining power” is 
“fashionably epidemic” and repeated “ad nauseam”: John H Wade “Forms of Power in Family Mediation and 
Negotiation” (1994) 8 Australian Journal of Family Law 40. 
57   Bryan, above note 48 at 523. 
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In this section some of these concerns, which are the “bad” of family mediation for 
women, are explained and evidenced through a critical analysis contextualised by the 
2006 introduction of mandatory family mediation.  In particular, two key theoretical 
assumptions that underpin the move to mandatory mediation are discussed; namely, 
that agreement in mediation is consensual, and that the third-party facilitator is neutral 
(or in the language of the 2006 amendments “independent”58). 
 
3.1.  Consensual Agreement in Mediation 
 
The mandatory nature of family dispute resolution under the 2006 amendments, 
means that, unless women are able to establish an exception (relating to family 
violence or child abuse), they will have little choice but to participate in a mediation-
like process.   It is dangerous to assume, however, that women will be in a position to 
be self-determining and empowered, in the ways discussed above, to the extent that 
truly consensual outcomes are possible.  This is because, as Renata Alexander has 
said, “the social, psychological and economic vulnerability of women blurs the 
distinction between consensual and coerced” agreement in mediation.59  In other 
words the reaching of agreement in mediation is often not a consensual process for 
women because the numerous vulnerabilities they can experience post-separation 
remove from them the potential for self-determinancy and empowerment that might 
otherwise be offered in the mediation environment.  
 
The issue of women’s post-separation vulnerability is real.  It is not a feminist “fit-up” 
or false construction.  The persistently gendered nature of society makes it simply a 
fact; a fact that is well supported by evidence that reflects what Penelope Bryan has 
referred to as “a dreary picture of women’s position in society.”60  Such a bleak 
position for women in contemporary Australia is difficult to accept (or perhaps even 
to believe); as in this country there is, at least rhetorically, an aspiration to gender 
equity.  However, as difficult as the recognition of women’s continued societal 
oppression may be, particularly in the context of family breakdown, it cannot be 
                                                 
58   As noted above, the definition of “family dispute resolution” includes a statement that the process is one “in 
which the practitioner is independent of all of the parties involved in the process.”: section 10F(b). 
59  Alexander, above note 49 at 257.  See also Mack above note 51 at 135-137. 
60   Bryan, above note 48 at 448. 
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ignored if steps are to be taken to ensure that mediated agreements can provide 
women with any semblance of justice.  This is particularly the case in the new 
circumstance of mandatory mediation.  
 
Economic vulnerability for women, also known as the “feminisation of poverty”, or the 
“economic differential”,61 is one of the most significant, and easily evidenced, issues of 
vulnerability for women, and is of particular relevance to women’s post-separation 
circumstances.  The fact that women are usually poorer than men cannot be contested; 
women, for example, continue to be likely to have lower incomes than men.62    
 
Being more financially vulnerable, poorer, than the person you are negotiating with 
significantly reduces a woman’s capacity to be self-determining or empowered in a 
mediation.63  As Kathy Mack puts it “in ADR (alternative dispute resolution), as with 
any dispute resolution process, the party with greater resources who can hire a lawyer, 
afford to wait out extended delay and raise more issues will have an advantage over a 
party who cannot.”64  Or as Penelope Bryan has said, a male party’s negotiating strength 
in family mediation is inevitably increased if he has the financial credibility to “threaten 
to terminate or extend the length of negotiations if the other party fails to meet his 
demands.”65  Women who are financially vulnerable on separation, and they are many, 
cannot afford to risk not reaching an agreement in mediation; they certainly cannot risk 
                                                 
61   Mack above note 51 at 126. 
62   House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Halfway to Equal: Report 
of the Inquiry Into Equal Opportunity and Equal Status for Women in Australia. Canberra: AGPS (1992) at 89.  
See also, Sylvia Hewlett A Lesser Life: The Myth of Women’s Liberation in America. New York: Morrow (1986). 
63 Studies such as the following clearly establish that women face higher levels of poverty after separation than 
men: Office of Women’s Policy A Social and Economic Profile of Women in Queensland in 1999 Department of 
Equity and Fair Trading: Queensland (1999); John Beggs and Bruce Chapman The Foregone Earnings from Child-
Rearing in Australia – Discussion Paper No.190 ANU Centre for Economic Policy Research: Canberra (1988); 
Peter McDonald (ed) Settling Up:  Property and Income Distribution on Divorce in Australia Prentice Hall of 
Australia:Melbourne (1996) and Kathleen Funder, Margaret Harrison and Ruth Weston Settling Down: Pathways 
of Parents After Divorce Australian Institute of Family Studies: Melbourne (1993).  See also for additional 
perspectives on this issue: Lenore Weitzman The Divorce Revolution:  The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for Women and Children in America Free Press: New York (1985) and Lenore Weitzman and 
Mavis Maclean (eds) Economic Consequences of Divorce:  The International Perspective Clarendon Press: Oxford 
(1992); Kate Hughes (ed) Contemporary Australian Feminism 2 Addison Wesley Longman Australia: Melbourne 
(2nd ed, 1997); Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen (eds) Australian Poverty: Then and Now Melbourne 
University Press: Melbourne (1998); Miiko Kumar “‘Justice Sally Brown: Educating the Bench” (1995) 6(2) 
Polemic 93; Marcia Neave “Women Divorce and Redistributing the Cost of Children” in Ann Edwards and Susan 
Magarey (eds) Women in a Restructuring Australia: Work and Welfare Allen and Unwin: Sydney (1995) at 223.  
For a Canadian perspective see Mary Jane Mossman and Morag MacLean “Family Law and Social Welfare:  
Toward a New Equality” (1986) 5(1) Canadian Journal of Family Law 79.  See also Bruce Smyth and Ruth 
Weston Financial Living Standards After Divorce: A Recent Snapshot Research Paper No.23 Australian Institute 
of Family Studies: Melbourne (2000). 
64  Mack, above note 51 at 126. 
65   Bryan, above note 48 at 449. 
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the potential of the matter going on to a costly trial.  Financially vulnerable women are 
therefore more likely to be coerced into accepting an early or (at least from their 
perspective) an unjust or severely compromised settlement.66  There is nothing 
consensual about this, and self-determination and empowerment have been lost.   
 
The negative impact of economic vulnerability on the ability of women to engage in 
truly consensual bargaining in mediation is exacerbated by a number of additional 
difficulties that women face post-separation.  These difficulties are associated with, 
for example, their social and psychological situation.  Single mothers experience a 
social status disparity with their former partners that, consistent with what was said 
above in relation to post-separation poverty for women generally, is directly related to 
the fact that single mothers are likely to earn substantially less than their former 
partner.  Single mothers also usually bear a heavier parenting and child or elder care 
burden,67 they have fewer opportunities to achieve an equal or higher level of 
education, and are likely to remain at a lower occupational rank.68   
 
Psychological vulnerability is related to the financial and social vulnerabilities women 
may have to cope with post-separation.  Research has established that women 
experience higher levels of depression and distress than men;69 and that “among all 
marital status categories, depression rates are highest for separated and divorced 
women.”70  
 
                                                 
66   Ibid. 
67   Michael Bittman, Juggling Time: How Australian Families Use Time Office of Status of Women, Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet: Canberra (1991).  For further discussion of women’s work as carers see also for 
example, Jane Lewis “’It All Really Starts in the Family …’ Community Care in the 1980s” (1989) 16 Journal of 
Law and Society 8, and Janet Finch and Dulcie Groves (eds) A Labour of Love: Women, Work and Caring 
Routledge and K Paul: London (1983).  Also important in this context is the overt failure of society to value the 
work women do as carers – on this point see for example, Marilyn Waring Counting for Nothing: What Men Value 
and What Women are Worth University of Toronto Press: Toronto (2nd ed, 1999). 
68   See Alice H Eagly “Gender and Social Influence” (1983) 38 American Psychologist 971 and Charlan Jeanne 
Nemeth “Reflections on the Dialogue Between Status and Style:  Influence Processes of Social Control and Social 
Change”(1983) 46 Social  Psychology Quarterly 73. 
69 Susan Noel-Hoeksema “Sex Differences in Unipolar Depression: Evidence and Theory” (1987) 101 Psychology 
Bulletin 259, Ester D Rothblum “Women’s Socialisation and the Prevalence of Depression: The Feminine 
Mistake” (1982) 1 Women and Therapy 5, Sarah Rosenfield “The Effects of Women’s Employment: Personal 
Control and Sex Differences in Mental Health” (1989) 30 Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 77 and Sarah 
Rosenfield “Sex Differences in Depression: Do Women Always Have Higher Rates?” (1980) 21 Journal of Health 
and Social Behaviour 33. 
70   Bryan, above note 48 at 469. 
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Economic, social and psychological vulnerabilities significantly compromise a 
woman’s ability to effectively engage in consensus bargaining in the mediation 
environment.  Experiencing vulnerabilities such as these diminishes the capacity of 
women to advocate for their own interests and to pursue ideals of self-determinancy 
and empowerment.  These vulnerabilities also severely diminish any real opportunity 
a woman may have to reject an agreement she is not happy with.71  Indeed, as a result 
of their post-separation vulnerability women may agree to certain outcomes in 
mediation not because of the success of the principles of consensus bargaining, but 
because of factors such as “ignorance, fear, guilt or low expectations.”72
 
It is of significant concern, then, that the 2006 family law amendments will result in 
more and more women, in circumstances of real vulnerability, negotiating on their 
own behalf in compulsory family mediation contexts.  Mandating family dispute 
resolution processes, such as mediation, will simply, and inevitably, result in the 
reality of these vulnerabilities impacting negatively on post-separation agreements 
and arrangements.  Certainly, the post-separation vulnerability of women will mean 
that many mediated agreements may jeopardise their needs and interests.  This cannot 
be said to be good.     
 
3.2. The Independence (Neutrality and Impartiality) of the Mediator 
 
Neutrality, or independence, on the part of family dispute resolution professionals (for 
our purposes, mediators) continues to be central to the theory of informal dispute 
resolution processes such as mediation.73  The notion of a neutral third party is 
expressed as “independence” in the 2006 amendments, with the definition of the 
process of family dispute resolution referring to family dispute resolution practitioners 
as “independent of all the parties involved in the process.”74  Christopher Moore 
                                                 
71   LM Leitch “The Politics of Compromise: A Feminist Perspective on Mediation” (1986-7) 14-15 Mediation 
Quarterly 163. 
72   Alexander, above note 49 at 259. 
73   For example Hilary Astor ‘Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice – Part I’ (2000) 11 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 73 refers to neutrality as ‘a significant concept in mediation.’ 
74   Section 10F(b) of the Bill. 
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states that an independent mediator is one who has a neutral relationship to the parties, 
and an impartial stance on the problems in question.75   
 
It is certainly usual for descriptions of mediation, and like processes, to make some 
reference to third-party neutrals.76  And ideals of mediator impartiality and neutrality 
remain consistent in statements of mediator ethics.77   In the context of the 2006 
family law amendments, it is important that the notion of an “independent” mediator 
in family dispute resolution draws from the legitimacy of the objective liberal legal 
ideology of judicial neutrality.78  Nevertheless the mediation literature also 
acknowledges that the concept of neutrality in mediation is complex, difficult and to a 
large extent unreal.79  It is the potential falsity of mediator independence that, for the 
reasons explored below, means that mediation may not be a good process for women. 
 
It is, on one hand, possible to accept that practitioners working under the new 
legislation will ensure that they do not mediate a matter where they have prior 
knowledge of the parties, or of the matter itself.  This is one element of independence 
                                                 
75   Christopher W Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, 3rd ed, 2003, 
Jossey-Bass, San Francisco at 52.  
76   For example, Boulle acknowledges that ‘definitions of mediation frequently assert that the mediator is a 
neutral intervener in the parties’ dispute’: Laurence Boulle Mediation: Principles Process Practice Butterworths: 
Australia (1996) at 18.  Further one of the most commonly accepted and often cited definitions, that of Folberg and 
Taylor, refers to mediation as a process involving ‘the assistance of a neutral person or persons’: Jay Folberg and 
Alison Taylor Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflict Without Litigation Jossey-Bass: San 
Francisco (1984) at 7-8.  Interestingly Sir Laurence Street’s three fundamental principles of mediation do not 
include a reference to neutrality on the part of the mediator:  Laurence Street “The Language of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution” (1992) 3 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 144 at 146; see also for example Australian 
Law Reform Commission Review of the Adversarial System of Litigation – ADR – its role in federal dispute 
resolution Issues Paper 25 Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra (1998) at 26. 
77 Association for Conflict Resolution – information and publications available from www.acrnet.org (accessed 20 
March 2006).  See also Note (1984) ‘Standards of Practice for Family Mediators’ 17 Family Law Quarterly 455; 
Christopher Moore SPIDR’s Ethical Standards: Six Viewpoints National Institute of Dispute Resolution: 
Washington DC (1987); John Feerick, Carole Izumi, Kimberlee Kimberlee, Lela Love, Robert Moberly, Leonard 
Riskin, Edward Sherman “Symposium: Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution” 
(1995) 1 Journal of Dispute Resolution 95; Richard Cohen “Mediation Standards” (1995) 6(1) Australasian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 25.  See also National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, The 
Development of Standards for ADR: Report. Canberra (2001). 
78 Boulle, above note 75 at 20. 
79   G Kurien, ‘Critique of Myths of Mediation’ (1995) 6 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 43 at 52.  See 
also, for example, Sarah Cobb and Janet Rifkin, ‘Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation’ 
(1991) 16 Law and Social Inquiry 35, M Feer, ‘Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality – 
Commentary’ (1992) 10(2) Mediation Quarterly 173, S Silbey, ‘Mediation Mythology’ (1993) 9(4) Negotiation 
Journal 349, TF Marshall, ‘The Power of Mediation’ (1990) 8(2) Mediation Quarterly 115, L Fisher, ‘What 
Mediators Bring to Practice: Process, Philosophy, Prejudice, Personality’ (2000) 5(4) ADR Bulletin 60, SE Bernard, 
JP Folger, HR Weingarten and ZR Zumeta ‘The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation’ (1984) 
4 Mediation Quarterly 61, M McCormick, ‘Confronting Social Injustice as a Mediator’ (1997) 15 Mediation 
Quarterly 293, R Dingwall, ‘Some Observations on Divorce Mediation in Britain and the United States’ (1986) 11 
Mediation Quarterly 5, Gregory Tillet Resolving Conflict – A Practical Approach Sydney University Press: 
Sydney (1991), Boulle above note 75 at 19, Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin Dispute Resolution in Australia 
Butterworths: Sydney (2nd ed, 2002).  
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that Moore refers to above as “neutrality in relation to the parties”.  This sense of 
independence is certainly relatively easy to adhere to in terms of the practice of 
mediation under the 2006 amendments.  It relates directly to a lack of overt bias and 
an absence of conflict of interest; key aspects of appropriate process in the practice of 
mediation.  As the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council 
(NADRAC) has put it: “The importance of exhibiting a lack of bias is that the parties 
can be satisfied that they can trust the practitioner to conduct the process fairly.”80
 
It is more difficult to accept, however, in the context of the reforms, that mediators 
will be able to be independent in terms of being “neutral in relation to the parties” or 
“impartial in relation to their stance on the problems in question” in the sense that 
they will not make value judgments of the parties, or of the issues in dispute.  A 
number of factors, specific to the context of the new environment of mandated 
mediation, compromise this aspect of independence, and cause concern about whether 
just process and outcomes for women in mediation are truly possible.   
 
First, mediators are very powerful in the mediation environment, and exercise a power 
of influence over the outcomes of mediations that is informed, and perhaps driven, by 
their views and values about families, separation, the best interests of children and the 
position of women in society.81  Second, mediators will be required by the legislation 
to judge the parties as to whether they have made a “genuine effort” to resolve issues 
for the purposes of writing a certificate of attendance.  And third, mediators are 
specifically obligated by the amendments to raise the option of equal time shared 
parenting with the parties.82   
 
3.2.1 Compromising Mediator Independence: Mediator Power 
 
                                                 
80   NADRAC above note 76 at 112. 
81   Robert Dingwall “Empowerment or Enforcement? Some Questions About Power and Control in Divorce 
Mediation” in Robert Dingwall and John Eekelaar (eds) Divorce Mediation and the Legal Process Oxford 
University Press: Oxford (1988) at 150; David Greatbatch and Robert Dingwall “Selective Facilitation: Some 
Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators” (1989) 23(4) Law and Society Review 613; 
Bernard Mayer “The Dynamics of Power in Mediation and Negotiation” (1987) 16 Mediation Quarterly 75.  See 
also Marion Roberts “Who is in Charge? Reflections on Recent Research on the Role of the Mediator” (1992) 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 372, Bernard Mayer “The Dynamics of Power in Mediation and 
Negotiation” (1987) 16 Mediation Quarterly 75,  
82   See section 63DA(2) of the Bill which requires this issue to be raised if a family dispute resolution practitioner 
is giving advice to parties in relation to a parenting plan. 
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In the mediation environment, whilst mediators do not have the power to make an 
authoritative decision, they do have a substantial level of power associated with their 
role, and are able to use that power to affect the direction and content of negotiations 
and to influence the final decision of the parties.83  This means that, in general terms, 
it is a mistake to think that mediators control only the process, and not the content, of 
discussions or outcomes.  Influence such as this is relatively covert and driven by 
ideology and personal values. It contradicts the notion of independence in a way that 
is of particular concern for women in a society that is persistently patriarchal.  
 
Mediator power in the sense of an ability to influence mediated outcomes is, like 
neutrality or independence, a very complex notion that should not be over 
simplified.84  There are many sources of power,85 and simple structural analyses of 
power that focus on it as something mediators do or do not “possess and use to exert 
over others,”86 take little account of the practically contextual and contingent nature 
of the real dynamics of power in mediation.87  Certainly the “distinction between 
process and content is ambiguous,”88 and certainly also practice and ideology vary 
widely in the mediation profession.89  However, as Dingwall has said “the first step 
must be to acknowledge the power of mediators and to accept that its existence 
creates a potential for abuse which may be different from but is no less real than the 
dangers of adversarial dispute proceedings.”90
 
Linda Fisher has made such an acknowledgement, in a refreshingly honest way, in 
writing that: “One so called ‘myth’ is the accepted wisdom that mediators have only 
procedural power: it is the parties who reach a decision on what to do.  The reality is 
                                                 
83   See authorities above note 80. 
84   Hilary Astor “Some Contemporary Theories of Power in Mediation: A Primer for the Puzzled Practitioner” 
(2005) 16(1) Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 30-39. 
85   Mayer, for example identifies 10 sources of power:  Formal authority, expert/information power, associational 
or referent power, resource power, procedural power, sanction power, nuisance power, habitual power, moral 
power, and personal power: Mayer above note 80 at 77-78.  See also Wade above note 55. 
86  Astor and Chinkin above note 78 at 148. 
87   For example, Mayer says that the power of the mediator is limited by “his or her role, the nature of the 
mediation contract, the constraints facing the parties, the social structure within which the mediation occurs, and 
self imposed ethical restrictions.” Mayer above note 80 at 78. 
88   Astor and Chinkin above note 78 at 147. 
89   TF Marshall (1990) “The Power of Mediation” 8(2) Mediation Quarterly 115 at 120. 
90   R Dingwall (1988) “Empowerment or Enforcement? Some Questions About Power and Control in Divorce 
Mediation” in R Dingwall and J Eekelaar (eds) Divorce Mediation and the Legal Process, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, at 150 at 166. 
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that we steer the mediation every inch of the way in terms of content as well as 
process.  We do this by being more (or less) directive, and more (or less) 
interventionist, depending on our personality and our prejudices.”91  The feminist 
concern about this level of influence is that research has shown that its use in the 
family law context may be gendered.  For example, the Report on the Evaluation of 
the Family Court of Australia Mediation Service stated that “women were 
significantly more likely to report that mediators pressured them into agreement or 
tried to impose their viewpoints on them.”92  
 
How might this influence manifest itself?  Predominantly it is the mediator’s control 
over the mediation process, and the possibility for value judgments to impact on the 
fairness of how that process unfolds, that creates an opportunity for the content of 
negotiations and outcomes to be influenced.  It is the mediator, for example, who 
makes decisions about who is allowed talking time and when.  It is the mediator who 
decides who is asked to be quiet or to wait, who is interrupted, and who is left to run 
the course of what they want to say.  The mediator has power over how parties’ 
statements are summarised, summed up, paraphrased, fed back; and how parties’ 
positions are reframed.  The mediator also has power over how issues are expressed 
on the agenda; and how issues might be prioritised on the agenda.   
 
The process choices and decisions a mediator makes are critical to whether an 
environment is created that supports the parties in being self-determining and 
empowered.  These decisions are also, inevitably, influenced by a mediator’s own 
personal values and value system.  The key concern, from a feminist perspective, is 
these values, which are unavoidably affected by the continuation of the gendered 
nature of the social, legal and political environment in which we exist, will potentially 
compromise the possibility of just outcomes for women in mediation.   
 
For example, a mediator who believes that a mother’s work is in the home may 
specifically seek to direct the parties’ negotiations away from any discussion or 
accommodation of her paid career; or may tolerate interruption of her on that issue; or 
                                                 
91   Fisher above note 78 at 64. 
92   Sophy Bordow and Janne Gibson Evaluation of the Family Court Mediation Service Family Court of Australia 
Research and Evaluation Unit (1994) at 112. 
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may summarise her statement on the issue slightly differently to her intentions.  The 
mediator might divert discussions or direct the parties’ thoughts and negotiations to an 
alternative focus through questioning, use of the agenda, or reframing to a substitute 
emphasis.  The research of Greatbatch and Dingwall, cited above, has shown that 
mediators do selectively facilitate discussion of issues;93 and, as has also been noted 
above, this selective facilitation can be gendered. 
 
Many mediators are probably unaware that they bring gendered values into their 
practice of mediation.  It is a point made here that is driven more by awareness raising 
than by criticism.  Also, the comments here are not made with any intention of 
diminishing the efforts of some mediators who do take steps to be aware of and 
address the possibility of such influences in their control of the process.  But it is 
important to acknowledge this element of mediator power, and that notwithstanding 
aspirations of independence (or perhaps even because of them), this power of 
influence may work directly to the ultimate detriment of a woman party.  From this 
perspective mandated mediation is not good for women, but rather more probably bad. 
 
Most importantly, where mediator influence significantly directs negotiations between 
the parties, the theoretical justifications of self-determination and party control or 
empowerment cannot be said to apply.  It is these justifications which are usually used 
to rationalise the legitimacy of agreements reached through mediation that contradict 
normative or rights-based approaches.  This means, from a feminist perspective, that 
the mandated use of mediation will result in anti-normative outcomes in which legal 
rights and protections achieved for women to date being fundamentally undermined 
by individual mediators, not through the empowerment or choice of women 
themselves.94   
 
The introduction of mandatory mediation gives mediators, therefore, a new and 
unprecedented level of power to influence a greater number of children’s dispute 
outcomes.  A power that will play out under the guise of ‘independence’.  In some 
instances, it may be that the parties’ agreed outcome simply reflects what is a de facto 
                                                 
93   Dingwall, above note 80; Greatbatch and Dingwall, above note 80. 
94   For commentary on the anti-normative potential of informal justice processes see Richard L Abel “The 
Contradictions of Informal Justice” in Richard L Abel (ed) The Politics of Informal Justice: Volume 1 Academic 
Press Inc: New York (1982) at 267. 
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decision of the mediator.  This is a concern where gendered notions of family, the 
roles of parents, and of women and mothers (for example) inform a mediator’s use of 
their power of influence in the mediation process.  Mediated outcomes may then 
reflect an overt contradiction of women’s self-determination and empowerment and, 
consequently, may conflict with their interests or safety.95  This is clearly not good 
for women and, of course, is antithetical to the notion of mediator independence.   
 
3.2.2  Compromising Mediator Independence: Judgment of “Genuine Effort” 
 
The independence of the mediator, in the sense that the mediator will specifically 
avoid judgment in terms of the parties, their dispute and its resolution, is an attractive 
feature of family mediation to potential parties.  This is because it can be seen as 
representing a presumptive acknowledgement that parents know what is best for them, 
their children and their family on separation (respect for self-determination), and it is 
also connected to ideals of fairness and appropriate process in informal consensus-
based negotiation environments.96   
      
Section 60I(8) of the amendments requires, however, that family dispute resolution 
practitioners provide certificates of attendance that also include a judgment as to 
whether the parties, or a party, has “made a genuine effort to resolve the issue or 
issues.”97  This judgement will be relevant to issues considered in later legal 
proceedings.  For example, a note after subsection 8 about certificates states that: 
“When an applicant files one of these certificates under subsection 7, the court may 
take the kind of certificate into account in deciding whether to make an order referring 
parties to family dispute resolution (see section 13C) and in determining whether to 
award costs against a party (see section 117).”  
 
There is, as a result of the recent inclusion in the amendments of a certificate that 
states that the parties did not attend dispute resolution because it was the view of the 
                                                 
95   Martha Fineman “Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal Change in Child Custody 
Decisionmaking” (1988) 101(4) Harvard Law Review 727. 
96   See reference to a party’s comments to this effect in Rachael Field ‘Neutrality and Power: Myths and 
Reality’(2000) 3(1) The ADR Bulletin 16. 
97   See section 60I(8)(b) and (c). 
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practitioner that it would not be appropriate,98 the potential to avoid the judgment of 
“genuine effort”.  The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee’s 
Report indicates that this certificate was introduced in response to concerns about 
cases where domestic violence is an issue.99  and 
 
Clearly, the possibility of being referred again to mediation, or of an unfavourable 
costs award, for a party who is judged as not having made a “genuine effort” in 
mediation is a significant fetter to their full and frank participation in the process.  
That is, a favourable judgment would appear to require “good behaviour” on the part 
of parties, and this creates significant pressure for them to appear to be reasonable, 
consensus-oriented and cooperative, and to not appear to be difficult or angry, 
unhappy or unreasonable.  For women, gendered issues, for example, those of post-
separation vulnerability, discussed above, will undoubtedly impact on their capacity 
to satisfy the mediator’s judgment of their efforts.  Post-separation stress and trauma 
cause distress and emotion; it may simply not be possible for some women to appear 
“reasonable” enough to satisfy an individual mediator’s perception of “genuine 
effort”.100  
 
Consistent with what was said above about the nature of a mediator’s power of 
influence over agreed outcomes in mediation, it is also a concern for women that in 
the making of a judgment as to the “genuine” nature of the parties’ efforts, the 
mediator, as a human facilitator of an experiential process, must inevitably be 
influenced, at least to some degree, by what remain patriarchally entrenched societal 
views and values.  The following discussion evidences why the notion of 
“independence” cannot be real in a context in which mediators are making judgment 
calls about behaviours in mediation that relate to standards of “effort”.101  The 
                                                 
98   See above note 18. 
99  
100   Family Services Australia’s submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee’s consideration of Provisions of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Bill 2005 noted the subjective nature of the practitioner’s assessment and the possibility 
that although a person may have a genuine wish to resolve matters, their demeanour may be interpreted 
as not ‘genuine’ : See the Committee’s Report, March 2006, at 38 - available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/family_law/report/index.htm (accessed 12 April 
2006)  
101   Note also the recognition of the contradiction of such a requirement with the notion of an 
independent practitioner in the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee’s Report ibid at 
38. 
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dilemma is shown to be a particularly significant one for women participants in 
mediation; and one that supports the argument that mandated mediation cannot be 
said to be good for women.   
 
First, women are, generally, not regarded as having the same level of credibility as 
men.102  This means in mediation that where the parties’ stories differ, the male 
party’s version is more likely to be implicitly accepted, or believed, by the mediator.  
In the mediation context where a mediator’s role is to facilitate an environment that 
promotes self-determination and empowerment, this is a significant issue.  Overt and 
covert messages about credibility can directly contradict a woman’s confidence and 
her ability to assert her needs and interests in her own voice; so it works against her 
potential ability to be self-determining or empowered.  Clearly it follows that a 
mediator who judges a woman party to lack credibility, may also judge her harshly 
when assessing the “genuineness” of her efforts in the negotiations.  
 
Second, diminutive gendered patterns of speech and silence can impact on whether a 
mediator thinks that a woman is making a “genuine effort” to resolve issues or not.103  
For example, if a woman is silenced by the power dynamics of relating to her former 
partner in the mediation environment, or if she is halting in her expression, or 
reluctant in terms of engaging in the negotiations, then a mediator may judge her 
efforts to be unsatisfactory against entrenched gendered standards of acceptable male 
behaviour that promote confidence and dominance.   
 
Third, stereotypical views of what amounts to appropriate feminine behaviour remain 
prevalent, and are likely to influence judgements of “genuine effort” on the part of 
women in the family dispute resolution environment.104  For example, as was noted 
may be likely above, a woman who appears to be difficult or uncooperative, or who 
gets angry or swears, may well be considered as not having made a “genuine effort” 
to resolve issues, because she will be cast as not behaving appropriately for a woman.  
                                                 
 102   Mack, above note 51 at 129. 
103   Id at 132. 
104   Stubbs has said, in terms of how women’s behaviour in informal processes might be judged or controlled, 
that “we shouldn’t presume that the informal is necessarily benign or even neutral.”: Julie Stubbs quoted in 
Margaret Baines, “Viewpoints on Young Women and Family Group Conferences.” in Christine Alder and 
Margaret Baines (eds.). …and when she was bad?: Working with Young Women in Juvenile Justice Related Areas 
National Clearinghouse for Youth Studies: Hobart (1986) at 46. 
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The dilemma for women in being judged in this way is exacerbated if the mediator is 
a misogynist or perhaps, even, a perpetrator of domestic violence themselves.  In the 
context of these issues women participants in mediation face potentially serious 
disadvantage in terms of the mediator’s judgment of “genuine effort”.   
 
3.2.3  Compromising Mediator Independence: Suggesting Equal Time Shared 
Parenting 
 
In addition to mediator values potentially influencing both the content and direction of 
negotiations in mediation, the values of the current government have been integrated 
into the obligation placed on mediators, in section 63DA, to raise the potential for 
equal time shared parenting to be explored as an option by the parties.  This obligation 
involves a direct influence on the outcomes of disputes mediated under the new 
provisions and contradicts the notion of “independence”. 
 
The idea of equal time shared parenting was considered in detail by the 2003 Federal 
inquiry into arrangements for children after separation, but the option of creating a 
rebuttable presumption in favour of it was not pursued in the Committee’s 
recommendations.105  Equal time shared parenting, formerly referred to as joint 
custody, means that when parents separate their children are required to spend equal 
amounts of time with each parent.  Whilst for some children in families where the 
parents can communicate effectively and cooperatively this works well, for many 
children, whose parents are significantly conflicted, it is not an ideal.106   
 
The key difficulty associated with equal time shared parenting is that it draws deeply 
on the rhetoric of parental and gender equality,107 and not on the reality that in most 
                                                 
105   Instead the Committee recommended the introduction of a rebuttable presumption in favour of equal shared 
parental responsibility: Report above note 4, recommendation 1 at xxi. 
106   Carol Smart ‘Equal Shares: Rights for Fathers or Recognition for Children’ (2004) 24(4) Critical Social 
Policy 484-503, Carol Smart, Neale and Flowerdew “Drifting towards shared residence?” (2004) 33 Family Law 
904-908, Carol Smart and A Wade “As fair as it can be? Childhood after divorce” In A. Jensen and L McKee (eds)  
Children and the Changing Family: Between Transformation and Negotiation London: Falmer/Routledge, 2003 at 
105-199.  See also Bruce Smyth (ed) Parent-Child Contact and Post-Separation Parenting Arrangements, 
Research Report no.9, Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2004 available at 
http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/resreport9/main.html (accessed 31 March 2006). 
107 This is notwithstanding a speech given by the then Federal Attorney-General, Daryl Williams at the National 
Press Club on 15 October 1996 where he listed amongst proposed Family Court changes that:  "Greater weight [is 
to be given] to the contribution of the primary homemaker and parent.":  K. Sweetman,  "Children gain in family 
law shake-up plan" Courier Mail, 16 October 1996. 
 26
intact families in Australia most of the parenting and child care work continues to be 
done by women.  Lyn Craig’s work, for example, with data from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Time Use Survey in 1997, shows patterns in relation to how 
mothers and fathers spend time with their children in intact families.108  Her 
calculations indicated that mothers spend 3 times more absolute time on child care as 
a primary activity than men.  Mothers also spend much more time alone with 
children; nearly half their time with children is spent alone, whereas fathers, who 
spend less time with children anyway, are only alone with the children for 16-18% of 
that time.109
 
It follows that many children will only begin to spend significant amounts of time 
alone with their father when their parents separate.  This may well, in some cases, 
lead to a new and more meaningful father-child relationship.  Certainly, however a 
new interactive and positive relationship does not develop overnight; it is something 
that requires time and effort and nurturing.  It is fair to say, then, that the compulsory 
raising of equal time shared parenting as a settlement option in mediation does not 
reflect the reality of parenting practice in many Australian families, and takes little 
account of the issues parents (fathers) may face when they find themselves having to 
parent on their own.   
 
Parents who are highly conflicted and experiencing tension and stress about 
arrangements for the children, are often those for whom equal time shared parenting 
would not be happy or successful.    For example, a study conducted by Janet Johnson 
in the USA concluded that:  children need “arrangements that minimize the potential 
for ongoing inter-parental conflict”; that in high conflict cases “arrangements should 
allow parents to disengage from their conflict with each other and develop parallel 
and separate parenting relationships with their children”; and that “the need for shared 
decision-making and direct communication should be kept to a minimum.”110   
 
                                                 
108  Lyn Craig “Do Australians Share Parenting? Time-diary evidence on fathers’ and mothers’ time with 
children” Paper Presented at the 8th Australian Institute of Family Studies Conference, March, 2003, available at 
http://www.aifs.org.au/institute/afrc8/craig.pdf. 
109   Ibid. 
110  J Johnson (1994) “High-Conflict Divorce” (1994) 4(1) The Future of Children: Children and Divorce 172.  
Dr Johnson is the Director of Research at the Center for the Family in Transition in California.  See also indicators 
for successful equal time shared parenting in Smyth above note 101 at 29. 
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Mandating mediation means, however, that many such parents will have mediation as 
their process of first resort, and experience the option of equal time shared parenting 
being raised by the ‘independent’ mediator.  It is not unreasonable to assume the 
consequence that a greater number of equal shared parenting outcomes will result 
from mediation.  This is serious for women in that it flies in the face of real parenting 
practice; but also because these outcomes will be driven by mediators imposing 
Government values on individual families, they will be based on presumption rather 
than reality, and in no way do they promote any sense of self-determination or 
empowerment.  Equally concerning is the impact on children, however, who, as the 
‘absent third parties’ in mediation, will be affected by such agreements, and have to 
live the reality of divided lives.                                                                                                                      
 
3.2.4.  A Contrary View On the Independence of the Mediator? 
 
If we were to suspend our disbelief and imagine a situation in which we accept that 
mediator independence can be maintained, it may cause alarm to realise that the 
position of women participants in family mediation remains similarly dim.  This is 
because, whether a mediator has entrenched patriarchal values or whether they have 
worked to contradict them, when mediators engage in the management of the 
mediation environment, if they do so with a focus on considering the parties to be 
bargainers on equal terms for their own positions, then the injustices of societally 
entrenched gendered differences will play out in any event.   
 
That is, the persistently and pervasively gendered nature society means that, in 
continuing to live with gendered power differentials between men and women, where 
men and women are treated equally and their differences are not recognised, then 
mediated outcomes will “reflect power differences between them.”111  The party (or 
gender) with the greater power will dominate, and the woman is more likely to 
experience the potential disadvantage.  Certainly a focus on the equality of the parties 
will result in an inability or failure to see or understand the impact of the 
vulnerabilities women often suffer in the mediation environment that have been the 
focus of this article.  Any gendered lack of understanding or misunderstanding of 
                                                 
111   Bryan, above note 48 at 447. 
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women’s presence or participation in the mediation process will influence the process 
and its outcomes to their detriment.  This is clearly bad for women.   
 
In one sense, it is possible to argue that although mediator independence is 
significantly compromised in the context of the practice of mediation under the 
amendments, the parties, and women, are protected by the fact that mediated 
agreements are not of themselves binding or enforceable.  However, realistically, 
mediation will most certainly become an option of, not only first, but also last resort 
for many.  This is, again, related to the many vulnerabilities faced by women 
economically, socially and psychologically post-separation.  Whether or not an 
agreement reached in mediation is legally or formally enforceable, it is likely to be the 
only agreement women will have to assist with managing conflict about children’s 
matters.  In any event, mediated agreements can be made binding and enforceable 
simply though filing consent orders in the court.  The influence of the mediator is, 
therefore, extremely significant.  And the issues that compromise mediator 
independence, discussed here, have real potential to disadvantage women parties to 
mediation.  This is bad. 
 
3.4. Issues of Privacy, Regulation and Training 
 
There are many more issues that could be discussed in relation to the potential 
disadvantage women face in mediation that would promote an understanding of why 
mandating mediation is inappropriate (bad) from a feminist perspective.  Two additional 
issues will be discussed here, namely, the private nature of the mediation environment; 
and the unregulated nature of the mediation profession, which means that there are as yet 
inconsistencies in levels of mediator training, and no national professional body to 
regulate professional conduct. These issues are discussed in turn below. 
 
3.4.1 The Private Nature of Mediation 
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It is nothing new to raise concerns about the private nature of mediation, and its 
implications for women parties.112  However, it is important to keep remembering that 
this is a critical aspect of why mediation can be said to be a bad process for women, 
particularly in the context of statutorily mandated mediation.  As mediations occur 
behind closed doors, with no public record of what is said, or even necessarily of the 
outcome, satisfactory accountability in terms of the process and its practice is not 
possible.  The privacy of the process also means that the handling of important public 
issues, such as post-separation justice for women, has been removed into the private 
sphere.  Therefore, the work of feminists in making publicly known the private 
domination of women in the domestic sphere, work that has contributed to a better public 
awareness of issues for women, will potentially be reversed.  The inherently political 
nature of post-separation issues for women are therefore essentially lost in the privacy of 
the mediation session,113 even more so with the introduction of mandatory mediation. 
 
Issues relating to the non-consensual nature of mediated agreements and the 
compromised nature of mediator independence, also gain heightened significance 
when it is considered that the implications play out away from public accountability 
measures that might prevent unjust or inappropriate outcomes for women participants.  
Litigated decisions, for example, are made publicly and judges are accountable for 
case outcomes and the reasoning behind them.114  Judges’ decisions are open to 
appeal and review by higher courts, the media scrutinise the decisions of the courts, 
the general public can observe most legal proceedings, and judgments are often 
published or are at least publicly accessible.  Accountability measures like these 
ensure, at least to some extent, the protection of parties’ rights and interests; decisions 
can be reversed or altered on appeal, and misconduct on the part of judges in the 
exercise of their powers can result in public disgrace and dismissal.115   
 
                                                 
112   Lichtenstein above note 22 comments at 20 that “mediation takes events and situations that are primarily 
political and privatises them.”  See also Jocelyn Scutt ‘The Privatisation of Justice: Power Differentials Inequality 
and the Palliative of Counselling and Mediation’ (1988) 11(5) Women’s Studies International Forum 503, and also 
Grillo above note 23.  
113   Lichtenstein above note 22 at 20. 
114   Jerold L Waltman and Kenneth M Holland (eds) The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies 
Macmillan Press Ltd: UK (1988). 
115   John B Thomas Judicial Ethics in Australia LBC Information Services: Sydney (2nd ed, 1997). 
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Protections such as these are not available in mediation.  Certainly, financially 
wealthy parties have the capacity to initiate legal proceedings in the event that their 
desired outcome is not reached through mediation, which could be seen as a form of 
protection against inappropriate or unjust outcomes.  But many of the women 
participants in family mediation, as the discussion above about the gendered nature of 
financial vulnerability has shown, will not have the necessary financial wealth for this 
truly to be an option.  Rather, women are more likely to be forced to accept the 
process and its outcomes even if they consider them not to be appropriate. 
 
There is, then, little public accountability demanded of mediation or of mediators, and 
for the most part, there is little protection available against any misuse, or 
inappropriate use, of mediator influence.  In fact, the language of ‘self-determination’ 
and ‘party empowerment’ overtly protects mediators by placing responsibility for 
decisions and outcomes reached through the process, theoretically at least, with the 
parties.  As Abel has noted, the informal nature of processes like mediation has 
removed any “need for the full panoply of procedural and constitutional 
protections.”116
3.4.2  Regulation and Training 
Concerns can also be raised about the scope and depth of mediator training and the 
lack of a sufficiently sophisticated treatment of gendered experiences of mediation.117  
Most mediation courses are, at most, five days long.118  This is a very brief period in 
which training is provided across many areas.  For example, LEADR’s four day 
                                                 
116   Abel, above note 93 at 271. 
117   For example, Kelly has emphasised the need to improve mediator training in order for mediators to be able to 
create a safe negotiating environment for victims of violence: above note 38 at 91.  The National Council on Violence 
Against Women has also suggested nine areas relating to domestic violence that should be the focus of mediator 
training.  These include, the nature and extent of violence in society, reasons for violence against women, and the 
impact of gender and of violence on the power relationship between the parties in mediation.  The guidelines also 
encourage an increase in reflective practice in terms of the mediator’s own attitudes to gender issues including violence 
against women.  National Council for Violence Against Women prepared by Astor Hilary Guidelines for Use if 
Mediating Cases Involving Violence Against Women NCVAW 1992 at 24-25.  The other issues listed are: reasons 
women stay with violent partners the effects of violence on children the relationship between violence and the criminal 
law and the nature and availability of legal remedies relevant to victims of violence the relationship between legal 
remedies and mediation techniques for the mediation of disputes which involve violence and ways of making 
appropriate and meaningful referrals to ensure the safety of the victim. 
118   See for example, details about training offered through the Dispute Resolution Centres of Queensland: 
http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/mediation/training.htm (accessed 31 March 2006), and the Institute of Arbitrators 
and Mediators Australia’s information about their Practitioner’s Certificate in Mediation: 
http://www.iama.org.au/courses.htm (accessed 31 March 2006).  The standard mediation workshops run by 
LEADR (Lawyers Engaged in ADR) are 4 days long: http://www.leadr.com.au/training.html#mediation (accessed 
31 March 2006). 
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course is said to offer participants: “an understanding of the different approaches to 
dispute resolution, an understanding of the mediation process and its philosophy, the 
basic communication skills necessary to participate effectively and constructively in 
mediation as a party, adviser or mediator, an understanding of the barriers to effective 
communication, the ability to identify disputes suitable for mediation, the ability to 
prepare to participate in mediation as a party, adviser or mediator, the ability to assist 
and advise clients in mediation, the opportunity to participate in a minimum of six 
simulated mediations as mediator or party, an opportunity to consider and discuss 
ethical dilemmas that may arise in mediation.”119  There is no specific mention of 
coverage of gender issues here, and little scope in such a full program to see how 
issues for women arising in mediation might be integrated into more generically 
labelled topics. 
A critical issue here also is the unregulated nature of the mediation profession in 
Australia.  There are currently, for example, no consistent professional training 
standards or requirements, and no national regulation body, although there has been 
“considerable debate in Australia over the last 15 years over issues of accreditation, 
training, standards, codes of conduct and professional organisation for mediators.”120  
Indeed mediators seem only recently to have substituted the word “profession” for 
“industry” in relation to their practice.   
Importantly, a proposed National Mediator Accreditation System will be considered 
at the National Mediation Conference in Hobart in May 2006.121  The draft proposal 
for the Accreditation System acknowledges the critical role of accreditation in 
promoting “quality, standards, and accountability among practitioners.”122  There is, 
however, no mention of a need for mediators to have any knowledge of gendered 
                                                 
119  http://www.leadr.com.au/training.html#mediation (accessed 31 March 2006).  
120   See the National Mediator Accreditation System draft proposal at: http://www.cdesign.com.au/nmc2006 
(accessed 31 March 2006) at 2.  For a discussion on the various aspects of these debates see also for example Astor 
and Chinkin (2002) at 203-234, and David Spencer and Tom Altobelli Dispute Resolution in Australia – Cases 
and Materials LawBook Co, Sydney 2005 at 455-494.  
121   The National Mediator Accreditation System draft proposal, above note 115.  See also, National Australian 
Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Who Says You’re Mediator? Towards a National System for Accrediting 
Mediators (2004). 
122   See the National Mediator Accreditation System draft proposal, above note 115 at 3. 
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issues in society and their impact on issues of participation for women in mediation in 
the proposal.123
This section has considered a number of concerns for women in mediation relating to 
the consensuality of agreements, the ‘independence’ of the mediator, the influence of 
mediators over negotiations and final agreements, the private and unaccountable 
nature of mediation, and mediator training.  These issues are significant and 
demonstrate, although by no means exhaustively, the dangers that exist for women 
parties participating in the mediation process.  
 
Clearly then, requiring mediation to be a dispute resolution process of first resort for 
most women is at the least unwise, and, at the worst, overtly disregards post-
separation injustice for women.  To put it simply, women are now more at risk of 
being coerced into accepting informal agreements, and they are likely to be 
disadvantaged by the fact of significant mediator power that is used to influence 
mediated outcomes by mediators with limited knowledge of gendered issues, in a 
private and unaccountable context of professed ‘independence’.  This is some of the 
‘bad’ for women of mandating mediation in children’s disputes.  The worst, however, 
is to come. 
 
4. Feminist Perspectives on Mediation:   The Ugly 
 
The ugly aspect of family mediation arises in terms of its use when family violence has 
been present in the relationship.  Violence against women is about control, power and 
domination based on gender.  All and any of the affirmative aspects of mediation, 
discussed in section two, above, have little or no prospect of becoming a reality for 
women in the event that family violence has been perpetrated by one party against 
                                                 
123   The Draft Proposal states that the National Mediation Standard (NMS) will require knowledge of the 
following areas: The nature of conflict, including the dynamics of violence, the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of mediation, pre-mediation preparation, intake and screening, communication patterns in 
conflict situations, negotiation dynamics in mediation, cultural issues in mediation and dispute resolution, the 
stages and functions of the mediation process, the roles and functions of mediators, ethical issues for mediators, 
with particular reference to dealing with power imbalances, confidentiality, impartiality and avoiding conflicts of 
interest, key issues in a specific Code of Conduct selected for the course, the basic law of mediation on 
confidentiality, enforceability of mediated agreements and liability of mediators: National Mediator Accreditation 
System draft proposal, above note 115 at 11. 
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another.  It is important to emphasise here that family violence is gendered violence, it is 
most often perpetrated by a man against a woman.124   
 
This section discusses why family violence prevents the real possibility of empowerment 
and self-determination for women.  The issues considered will demonstrate that whilst 
the vulnerabilities women in general can face in mediation (discussed in section three 
above) contradict the wisdom of requiring all children’s disputes to go through a 
mediation process in the first instance, because they are likely to put many women at a 
disadvantage; the presence of violence in a relationship makes participation in mediation 
potentially dangerous for women.  This is therefore, drawing from the contemporary 
vernacular, when things get ugly. 
 
The term “family violence” is used here to refer to all forms of violence perpetrated 
against women in domestic relationships; for example, physical, emotional, financial, 
psychological, and social violence.  The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) defines family 
violence in section 60D as “conduct, whether actual or threatened, by a person towards, 
or towards the property of, a member of the person’s family that causes that or any other 
member of the person’s family to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, his or her 
personal well being or safety.”125   In 2004 57% of Australian women who participated 
in the International Violence Against Women Survey reported that they had been 
subjected to violence during their lives.126   
 
                                                 
124   NSW statistics, for example, indicate that in 2004 the majority of victims of domestic violence were women 
(71.1%) and the majority of perpetrators of violence were male (80.4%).  NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research (2005) Trends and Patterns in Domestic Violence Assaults available at 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/pages/bocsar_pub_dtoh#domestic_violence (accessed 
31 March 2006).  Further the World Health Organisation’s 2002 Report on Violence and Health indicates that 
globally, women bear the burden of domestic violence: available at 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report (accessed 31 March 2006).  See also 
Women’s Safety After Separation Project, Fact Sheet 4: Domestic Violence is Gendered Violence, available at 
http:wsas.here.ws (accessed 31 March 2006).  The Women’s Safety After Separation project is funded by the 
Australian Government Office for Women. 
125  An alternative definition is that found in the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 (Qld) which 
defines domestic violence in section 11 as “wilful injury, wilful damage to property, intimidation or harassment, or 
indecent behaviour without consent committed against (or threatened against) another person if a domestic 
relationship exists between the parties.”  Section 11A of that Act states that “A domestic relationship is said to be 
present in a spousal relationship, an intimate relationship, a family relationship and an informal care relationship.” 
126   J Mouzos and T Makkai Women’s Experiences of Male Violence: Findings from the Australian Component 
of the International Violence Against Women Survey (IVAWS)at 44.  Note also that male victims of violence 
experience of domestic violence differs from that of women.  For example, it is not as prolonged or extreme, there 
is likelihood of being injured, they are less likely to be fearful of their safety and are more likely to have financial 
and social independence:  Women’s Safety After Separation Project Fact Sheet 4: Domestic Violence is Gendered 
Violence above note 119.   
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There is in fact now a relatively wide acknowledgment that, theoretically, mediation is 
generally not appropriate where family violence has been or is present in the relationship.  
This acknowledgement is found not only in the feminist literature on mediation,127 but 
also now in statements of proponents of mediation,128 in the practice directions of the 
Family Court of Australia,129 and in government literature.130   
 
The amendments acknowledge these perspectives by allowing, in section 60I(9), 
exemption from family dispute resolution in situations where the court is satisfied there 
are reasonable grounds to believe there is a risk of family violence (or child abuse).131  
Significantly, if a party satisfies an exception, the court can still make an order requiring 
that the person attend a dispute resolution process.132  The reasoning behind this was to 
“discourage people from trying to avoid the provisions and (to) ensure that the court 
considers reasons for exemption.”133
 
                                                 
127   Of particular importance in gaining this acknowledgment was Hilary Astor’s paper for the National 
Committee on Violence Against Women in 1991 above note 47.  See also Mack above note 51 at 125. 
128   Kelly above note 38 at 91 referring to Barbara Hart “Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered 
Women and Children in Custody Mediation” (1990) 7 Mediation Quarterly 317.  See also Susan Gribben 
“Violence and Family Mediation: Practice” (1994) 8 Australian Journal of Family Law 22.  Further the Family 
Law Council of Australia has acknowledged that mediation is not appropriate where there is a fear or threat of 
violence or abuse or where violence or abuse is occurring:  Family Law Council of Australia Report on Family 
Mediation 1992 at preface xiii. 
129  The Family Court introduced in 2004 a Family Violence Strategy that acknowledges that the Court is required 
“to have regard to the need to protect individuals from harm and family violence.”: at 3 referring to s.43(ca) of the 
Family Law Act, 1975 (Cth).  The Strategy also contains a number of guiding principles and key areas of 
action/operation.  The fourth key area relates to resolving disputes and notes that “While not all circumstances are 
appropriate for resolution by mediation, all clients of the Court participate in conferences.”: at 11.  The Family 
Violence Strategy is available at 
http://www.familycourt.gov.au/presence/connect/www/home/about/family_violence/family_violence_the_strategy 
(accessed 31 March 2006).  The Court’s previous 1993 practice direction on Family Violence stated that “the 
existence of family violence may have an effect upon the conciliation and mediation processes.  For those who are 
in fear of family violence: mediation will normally be regarded as inappropriate.”:  Family Court of Australia 
Chief Justice's Direction as to the Management of Cases Involving Family Violence 15 January 1993 Introduction 
and at point 4.  The Chief Justice also commented in 1991 that some matters where there is a real inequality in 
bargaining power or where there is violence may not be suitable for mediation:  Alastair Nicholson “Mediation in 
the Family Court” (1991) 65 Law Institute Journal 61 at 62. 
130   The Australian Law Reform Commission Reports on Equality Before the Law discussed the pervasive nature 
of violence against women in detail and specifically acknowledged that a history of domestic violence may make 
participation for women in alternative dispute resolution processes, such as mediation, inappropriate: See 
Australian Law Reform Commission Equality Before the Law: Women’s Access to the Legal System Report No 67 
AGPS Canberra 1994.   
131   Subsection 60J(1) of the Bill.  The explanatory statement for the Bill stated that “This exception recognises 
the impact that family violence can have on the capacity of parties to participate effectively in a dispute resolution 
process.”  Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 Explanatory Statement (2005) 
previously available at www.ag.gov.au (accessed December 2005).  
132   Section 60I(10). 
133   Explanatory Statement, 2005, at 3. 
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The existence of the exemption is, nevertheless, a positive thing, because as we have 
already discussed, the mediation context is an informal and private bargaining 
environment in which the parties are required to advocate for their own interests.  This is 
an environment in which a context of family violence will almost certainly provide the 
perpetrator of that violence with the opportunity to deny their victim any potential for 
self-determination or empowerment.  This significant disadvantage must be added to 
those addressed above for women generally, thus entrenching the oppressed position of a 
victim of violence in the mediation process.   
 
Indeed, the informality of the mediation environment provides an opportunity for a 
perpetrator to reinforce and exacerbate their control and domination of their victim; the 
nature and dynamics of a violent relationship make this the case.134  In this way the 
common feminist commitment to ending the perpetration of violence against women is 
firmly contradicted by the process.135   
 
And yet despite what we know of the effects of violence on a woman’s potential to 
participate effectively in mediation, and despite the inclusion of exceptions under the 
amendments to exempt victims of family violence from family dispute resolution 
processes, many victims of violence will in fact find themselves negotiating on their own 
behalf in the mediation environment.  There are many process and political reasons for 
this.  For example, a lack of other options being available may mean that for many 
victims, access to at least some third party assistance is perceived as better than 
attempting to negotiate alone.  Further, financial and other access to justice issues may 
well mean that many victims of violence do not have an opportunity to pursue an 
exemption under the amendments.  A contextual issue that entrenches the likelihood of 
this is that women and perpetrators often deny their own violence.  In the event that the 
violence is not raised by the parties, mediators are likely to find it “difficult to identify a 
                                                 
134   See for example Grillo above note 23; Hart above note 123; Rachael Field “Mediation and the Art of Power 
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relationship with a history of violence, because the man can be frightened that disclosure 
will threaten his control, and the woman can be frightened of what he will do if this 
happens, and they may both have become expert at rationalising, minimising, and hiding 
the violence and its destructive consequences.”136   
 
So when victims of violence find themselves in a mandatory mediation, as many 
probably will and perhaps often with that violence not acknowledged, what are some of 
the issues they will face?   
 
Most importantly, the focus in mediation on theoretical notions of party empowerment 
and self-determination can mean that the mediation process “ignores the power 
differences between men and women that put women at a disadvantage in negotiating 
with men.”137  These generally existent gendered power differences are exacerbated 
significantly by the dynamic of family violence, to the extent that the notion of ‘a level 
playing field’ is a rhetorical possibility only.   
 
Aspirations of empowerment and self-determination require a focus on cooperative and 
consensual approaches to dispute resolution.  These approaches are inherently not 
possible in terms of a perpetrator’s interactions with his victim, because consensuality 
and cooperation require people to act or work together for mutual benefit, and a 
perpetrator of violence “is not someone who can cooperate.  He understands mutual 
benefit as synonymous with his exclusive self-interest.”138  It is an oxymoron to suggest 
that a perpetrator of violence could engage in cooperative bargaining with his victim.139  
Perpetrators are far more likely to impose their own interests on their victim; and to 
coerce, to intimidate, to monitor and to threaten their victim.  Perpetrators of violence do 
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139   Hart above note 123 at 320. 
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not value their victims, and they also deny their own violence.140  Mediation becomes, 
then, an environment of disempowerment for a victim of violence, an environment in 
which it is almost impossible for her to represent her own interests confidently in 
negotiations.  
 
The presence of family violence in the history of the parties’ relationship means therefore 
that there can be no parity in the mediation bargaining environment.141  Parity cannot 
exist when one party is fearful of another; and fear is the key element of the gendered 
power and control that a perpetrator wields in mediation.  He can control the process and 
he can control outcomes because he can make his victim fearful; fearful about her own 
physical and emotional safety, and often also fearful for the safety and well-being of her 
children.  Even Kelly, a strong advocate for mediation, acknowledges that people “who 
are fearful do not belong in the mediation process.”142   
 
Real self-determination or party empowerment for women who are victims of violence 
simply cannot occur in a situation where there is a power imbalance created by fear.  Fear 
most certainly reduces “a woman’s ability to advocate for herself in the mediation 
process,”143 and fear will also make it likely that a victim of violence will give in or 
compromise her interests in order to “get the mediation over with”.  For example, 
Gagnon notes that a victim of violence “may give up her right to support or agree to give 
up assets to avoid further confrontation” with the perpetrator.144  Bagshaw et al’s study 
also reported that victims of violence in mediation compromised with their ex-partners 
“so as to finish their associations with them despite not achieving what they felt was a 
fair settlement.”145  The entrenched domination of the victim by the perpetrator through 
fear means that inequitable outcomes for victims of violence in mediation are probable.  
Clearly, then, the increased presence of victims of violence in mediation as a result of the 
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2006 amendments, and notwithstanding the exception, is a significant concern in relation 
to the interests and safety of women. 
 
The absence of any parity or possibility of empowerment or self-determination for 
victims of violence in mediation is a great concern.  Other process and practice issues 
also exacerbate the endangerment of victims of violence, however, and compromise the 
fairness and appropriateness of outcomes reached through mediation.146  The concerns 
raised above for example, in relation to the consensuality of agreement, mediator 
independence and mediator powers of influence are of even greater concern in relation to 
the participation of victims of violence in mediation.   
 
It is also problematic that there is too little acknowledgement of the fact that mediators 
and the mediation process are not able to realign the power of parties where one party has 
perpetrated violence against the other.  It cannot be said that “general techniques for 
empowerment”147 will address an imbalance created by violence, because an imbalance 
created by violence is not of a general nature.  It is a difficult and complex dynamic 
requiring expertise to understand it and work with (or against) it.   
 
Realistically, there is no intervention that can possibly reverse for victims what might be 
years of male dominance and control.  Shuttle or telephone mediations merely gloss over 
the reality of entrenched dominance through violence.  It is critical that the Australian 
government and also, to some extent, the mediation profession, acknowledge that a 
history violence is a factor of great and difficult significance that cannot be easily coped 
with through minor process interventions in the mediation environment – at least not if 
we are to ensure justice and safety for women.   
 
It is also important to acknowledge that the impact and effects of violence are at the least 
long-lasting, if not permanent.  It is inappropriate, therefore, to think that a mediator 
might be able, in the space of a short mediation, to achieve “what takes trained 
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psychologists years to accomplish working with violent offenders and abuse victims.”148  
Family violence can also work to continue to disempower a woman long after she has 
freed herself from the violent relationship.   
 
However, a critical consideration in terms of the amendments, is that many mandatory 
mediations will take place close to the time of separation.  This we know to be one of the 
most dangerous times for women victims of violence.149  Hart has also noted that many 
mediators believe that victims of family violence are safe once they have separated from 
the perpetrator.150  This is simply not the case, and such a belief places victims in 
increased danger because it means that mediators will not be alert to the true power and 
influence the perpetrator holds.  Mediation, in the mandatory form envisaged in the 
amendments, from this perspective, is clearly not a good option for victims of 
violence.151
 
The issues discussed, above, illustrate how the theoretical aspirations of mediation that 
find synergy with feminist principles cannot be said to apply to disputes where family 
violence sets the context of the negotiations.  They show that victims of violence are in 
fact endangered in mediation and that there is a strong possibility of unsafe and unjust 
mediated outcomes.152    Indeed, as Zylstra has said “not only does mediation fail to stop 
the violence but the future focus of standard mediation styles rather than a focus on past 
behaviour actually absolves the abuser of accepting responsibility for past behaviour.”153  
Certainly, a victim’s safety is potentially compromised in mediation and she is 
disadvantaged in terms of her participation in the process and the resultant outcome.     
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5. A Way Forward? 
 
It is not within the scope of this article to explore in detail the possible solutions to the 
dilemmas raised here.  It will be a key achievement if this article achieves a greater level 
of recognition of the dilemmas women will face in the new mandatory mediation context 
of Australian family law.  Before such recognition is achieved, and clearly there is little 
evidence of it in the current amendments, there are few reasons for extrapolating on 
possible ways forward. 
 
Nevertheless it would be unfair and remiss of an article that takes such a critical stance 
not to propose some form of resolution to the issues it raises.  Indeed, there are many 
possibilities.  For example, the legislation could be amended to better take account of the 
issues raised here.  Section 60I(9)(f) of the Bill currently provides a mechanism for the 
list of exemptions included under the heading “unable to participate effectively” to be 
added to.  The explanatory memorandum explains that “this allows flexibility to respond 
to issues that may arise in the implementation of these significant changes to the family 
law system.”154  A section acknowledging gender as a possible reason for being “unable 
to participate effectively” could work to integrate issues for women better into the 
provisions.  Further, funding could be provided to ensure that lawyers can act as 
mediation coaches and advocates for women (and for victims for violence in 
particular),155 mediator training could be vastly improved, with specialist training being 
required for practitioners of family mediation; and the new accreditation process could 
include a requirement for knowledge about gendered issues in society and in mediation.   
 
At the heart of the success of any of these approaches is a recognition that Australian 
society remains patriarchal, legally and socially; that is, dominated by the male 
perspective.  And further, that male violence against women is a significant aspect of the 
continuance of that domination.  When the Australian Government is prepared to 
acknowledge the reality of this, then there will truly be the prospect of addressing the 
concerns raised here. 
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Conclusion 
 
The 2006 family law amendments, that effectively mandate mediation as a dispute 
resolution process of first resort in children’s matters, will potentially lead to manifest 
post-separation injustice for women.  Feminist perspectives on mediation are, for the 
most part, challenging of mediation’s positive potential for women; and yet there is 
scope for mediation practice to accommodate these concerns and develop ways of 
protecting women and their interests in the mediation environment.  This is the 
challenge for the mediation profession: to seek to ensure that the good aspects of their 
professional practice are not compromised by the Government’s inappropriate policy 
decision to mandate mediation in circumstances where it can be bad or get ugly for 
women.   
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